Freedom of the sort implicated in acting freely or with free will is important to the truth of different sorts of moral judgment, such as judgments of moral responsibility and those of moral obligati
Haji (philosophy, U. of Minnesota, Morris) sets forth a detailed presentation of a new dilemma about freedom and deontic morality which closely mirrors the long-existing dilemma of freedom and respons
Something is subject to luck if it is beyond our control. In this book, Haji shows that luck detrimentally affects both moral obligation and moral responsibility. He argues that factors influencing th
To have free will with respect to an act is to have the ability both to perform and to refrain from performing it. In this book, Ishtiyaque Haji argues that no one can have practical reasons of a cert
Haji (philosophy, U. of Calgary) sets out the logical case that determinism is incompatible with both free will and moral responsibility. His topics include the consequence argument, alternative possi
This book addresses a dilemma concerning freedom and moral obligation (obligation, right and wrong). If determinism is true, then no one has control over one's actions. If indeterminism is true, then no one has control over their actions. But it is morally obligatory, right or wrong for one to perform some action only if one has control over it. Hence, no one ever performs an action that is morally obligatory, right or wrong. The author defends the view that this dilemma can be evaded but not in a way traditional compatibilists about freedom and moral responsibility will find congenial. For moral obligation is indeed incompatible with determinism but not with indeterminism. He concludes with an argument to the effect that, if determinism is true and no action is morally obligatory, right or wrong, then our world would be considerably morally impoverished as several sorts of moral appraisal would be unjustified.
The primary purpose of this book is to explain the distinction, on the one hand, between indoctrination and education, and, on the other, between responsibility-subverting manipulation and mere causat
