In a masterwork of brilliant storytelling, the epic fantasy of two parallel worlds--mystical Eldh and modern Earth--takes a surprising turn in Book Five of Mark Anthony’s thrilling saga of magic, susp
In the winter of 1933, eighteen-year-old Patrick (“Paddy”) Leigh Fermor set out to walk across Europe, starting in Holland and ending in Constantinople, a trip that took the better part of a year. Dec
In the winter of 1933 eighteen-year-old Patrick (“Paddy”) Leigh Fermor set out to walk across Europe, starting in Holland and ending in Constantinople, a trip that took him the better part of a year.
On a winter morning Ray Bhullar arrives at the gates of an Indian village. She is here to make a film. But this will be no ordinary tale about India - for this is no ordinary village. It is an open pr
In November 1941 Hitler ordered German forces to complete the final drive on the Soviet capital, now less than 100 kilometres away. Army Group Centre was pressed into the attack for one last attempt to break Soviet resistance before the onset of winter. From the German perspective the final drive on Moscow had all the ingredients of a dramatic final battle in the east, which, according to previous accounts, only failed at the gates of Moscow. David Stahel challenges this well-established narrative by demonstrating that the last German offensive of 1941 was a forlorn effort, undermined by operational weakness and poor logistics and driven forward by what he identifies as National Socialist military thinking. With unparalleled research from previously undocumented army files and soldiers' letters, Stahel takes a fresh look at the battle for Moscow, which even before the Soviet winter offensive, threatened disaster for Germany's war in the east.
In November 1941 Hitler ordered German forces to complete the final drive on the Soviet capital, now less than 100 kilometres away. Army Group Centre was pressed into the attack for one last attempt to break Soviet resistance before the onset of winter. From the German perspective the final drive on Moscow had all the ingredients of a dramatic final battle in the east, which, according to previous accounts, only failed at the gates of Moscow. David Stahel challenges this well-established narrative by demonstrating that the last German offensive of 1941 was a forlorn effort, undermined by operational weakness and poor logistics and driven forward by what he identifies as National Socialist military thinking. With unparalleled research from previously undocumented army files and soldiers' letters, Stahel takes a fresh look at the battle for Moscow, which even before the Soviet winter offensive, threatened disaster for Germany's war in the east.
In the winter of 1880–1881, the wealthy German businessman and self-taught archaeologist Heinrich Schliemann (1822–1890) embarked on a new project, to excavate the 'Treasury of Minyas' at Orchomenos. He was accompanied by his wife and by the distinguished Oxford Assyriologist A. H. Sayce. This book, published in 1881, begins with a vivid description of the journey from Athens to Orchomenos, through gorges and swamps, and across mountain passes. Schliemann mentions earlier attempts to excavate the 'treasury' (actually a Mycenaean beehive tomb), the difficulty of the terrain, and how he engaged over 100 local people to assist in the removal of earth and stones from a large area. He lists pottery, artefacts and stone implements, and gives detailed measurements of walls, towers and gates. The book includes drawings of sculpted decorations including rosettes and spirals, and the texts of classical Greek inscriptions found at Orchomenos and at nearby Copae.
