Until recently, philosophers tended to be suspicious of the concept of need. Contributors to this volume build on recent work establishing its philosophical importance. David Wiggins, Gillian Brock and John O'Neill propose remedies for some mistakes made in ignoring or marginalising need, for example in need-free theories of rationality or justice. Christopher Rowe, Soran Reader and Sarah Miller highlight insights that emerge when the concept of need is explored through Plato, Aristotle and Kant - and others that emerge when historical work is seen through the lens of need. Jonathan Lowe and Garrett Thomson consider the role need plays in the philosophies of action and mind. Bill Wringe, David Braybrooke and Sabina Alkire debate how our obligations relating to need are best understood and articulated, and how we can best ensure they are fulfilled, exploring for example how talk of need is related to talk of rights, well-being or capability.
Museums and their practices - especially those involving collection, curation and exhibition - generate a host of philosophical questions. Such questions are not limited to the domains of ethics and aesthetics, but go further into the domains of metaphysics, epistemology and philosophy of religion. Despite the prominence of museums as public institutions, they have until recently received surprisingly little scrutiny from philosophers in the Anglo-American tradition. By bringing together contributions from philosophers with backgrounds in a range of traditional areas of philosophy, this volume demonstrates how their work can enhance our understanding of museums and shed light on the philosophical questions raised by museum practices. Many of the chapters in this volume make the case that the philosophy of museums is of vital concern, not only to those philosophers at work in the emerging field but also to practitioners within the museum world and to anyone who enjoys visiting museums.
This volume is based on The Royal Institute of Philosophy's London Lecture series for 2017–18. It consists of fourteen original papers in which leading philosophers consider key concepts in the area, including those of passion and emotion, and their intentionality, as well as love, guilt, forgiveness, desire and regret. The relationships between the passions and religious belief and to aesthetics are also analysed, alongside the ethical and psychoanalytical implications of our emotions. Connexions between the passions and our reading of fiction and our response to developments in technology are considered, as is the work of Descartes, Spinoza, Nietzsche, William James and R. G. Collingwood. This book will be an essential compendium to contemporary work in the area.
The Royal Institute of Philosophy's London Lecture series for 2013–14 brought together contributions from a distinguished group of leading figures in the philosophy of mind. The topic the lecturers were asked to speak and write on, 'Mind, Self and Person', has been at the forefront of philosophical enquiry throughout the history of the subject, and, as will be evident from this volume, is as lively and contested an area of investigation in contemporary philosophy as it was in the days of the ancient Greeks. This collection of papers covers a wide range of issues, including consciousness, the mind and its relation to the body, the self, the nature of the human person, personal identity, the link between mind and morality, the existence of group minds and the educational implications of what we think about the mind.
This volume presents cutting edge research by many of the leading researchers in the field of religious epistemology, a field that has seen major development in recent years. This book attempts to answer the questions of: how reasonable is belief in God? Can a good evidential case be made either for the existence of God, or against the existence of God? Does the existence of enormous suffering, or religious disagreement, provide significant evidence against the existence of God? How might we best come to know God? What's required for religious belief to qualify as rational? All of the papers included in this volume aim to be accessible to the interested layperson.
History of Philosophy: Twentieth-Century Perspectives is based on the Royal Institute of Philosophy's annual lecture series for 2014–15. A group of eminent scholars consider important figures in the history of philosophy from Plato and Aristotle to twentieth-century philosophers including Frank Ramsey and Wittgenstein. Along the way, there are considerations of Plotinus and Aquinas, the Rationalists and Empiricists of the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries, as well as Kant, Hegel, Nietzsche, Frege and the Analytic Revolution. Readers will find new perspectives on the thought of these philosophers as well as stimulating discussions of the validity of their arguments. The volume will be essential reading for all those interested in the history of philosophy.
This collection of essays from the Royal Institute of Philosophy, first published in 2007, looks at a wide range of topics in political philosophy ranging from issues such as terrorism, egalitarianism and the just war to considerations of the political philosophy of Edmund Burke, of philosophical liberalism and of the current state of utilitarianism in political thought. There are also treatments of the role of innocence and of emotion in political discourse.
Preferences are often thought to be relevant for well-being: respecting preferences, or satisfying them, contributes in some way to making people's lives go well for them. A crucial assumption that accompanies this conviction is that there is a normative standard that allows us to discriminate between preferences that do, and those that do not, contribute to well-being. The papers collected in this volume, written by moral philosophers and philosophers of economics, explore a number of central issues concerning the formulation of such a normative standard. They examine what a defensible account of how preferences should be formed for them to contribute to well-being should look like; whether preferences are subject to requirements of rationality and what reasons we have to prefer certain things over others; and what the significance is, if any, of preferences that are arational or not conducive to well-being.
Knowledge is often thought of as something that we each individually have, something inside our own minds. But our knowledge depends on other people's testimony and expertise. And what we know depends on what our society makes it possible for us to know, either formally or informally through social norms and practices that suppress some ideas and privilege others. The philosophical study of the social dimension of knowledge is called Social Epistemology. This volume gathers experts in the field from across the world to give their perspectives on it.
This volume is based on the lectures given in London at The Royal Institute of Philosophy's annual lecture series for 2016–17. The topic chosen for the series was metaphysics, an area where at the moment there is much exciting and innovative work being done. Several papers in the volume consider the nature of metaphysical explanation, its scope and limits. There are also papers on such central metaphysical topics as essence, necessity, possibility and identity. Ranging wider, and testifying to the breadth of metaphysics as a subject, there are treatments of free will, of solipsism in Wittgenstein's philosophy of the 1930s, of the nature of social practices, of the notion that the conceptual recommendations of metaphysics are to do with assessing and perhaps changing the way we live, and also a consideration of the ontological status of the foetus and the unborn child.
What is the relationship between phenomenology and naturalism? Are they mutually exclusive or is a rapprochement possible between their approaches to consciousness and the natural world? Can phenomenology be naturalised and ought it to be? Or is naturalism fundamentally unable to accommodate phenomenological insights? How can phenomenological method be used within a naturalistic research programme? This cutting-edge collection of original essays contains brilliant contributions from leading phenomenologists across the world. The collection presents a wide range of fascinating and carefully argued answers to these questions.
In this volume a group of distinguished aestheticians consider the distinctive ways painting, sculpture, music, poetry and the cinema approach their subject matter and add to our aesthetic understanding. In addition these are discussions of artistic value and artistic truth, of the value of performance and of the problem of fakes, all of which contribute to a volume which will be of interest both to aestheticians and philosophers more generally.
Philosophy of Action is based on the lectures given in the Royal Institute of Philosophy's annual London lecture series 2015–16. This volume brings together an internationally distinguished team of lecturers. As befits the theme itself, a wide range of topics relating to action are covered. These include the nature of action itself and its relation to knowledge-how. There are a number of papers on issues relating to freedom and responsibility, and also to the relation between action and causation. Other papers consider the notion of planning in relation to agency, and the connection between agency and practical abilities. And there are also considerations of virtue and ethical concepts as applied to the notion of action. The papers collected here will testify to the liveliness of discussions of action in contemporary philosophy, and will also demonstrate the way many ancient conceptions of action are being developed in contemporary philosophical thought.
How we engage in epistemic practice, including our methods of knowledge acquisition and transmission, the personal traits that help or hinder these activities, and the social institutions that facilitate or impede them, is of central importance to our lives as individuals and as participants in social and political activities. Traditionally, Anglophone epistemology has tended to neglect the various ways in which these practices go wrong, and the epistemic, moral, and political harms and wrongs that follow. In the past decade, however, there has been a turn towards the non-ideal in epistemology. Articles in this volume focus on topics including intellectual vices, epistemic injustices, interpersonal epistemic practices, and applied epistemology. In addition to exploring the various ways in which epistemic practices go wrong at the level of both individual agents and social structures, the papers gathered herein discuss how these problems are related, and how they may be addressed.
Musical listening, looking at paintings and literary creation are activities that involve perceptual and cognitive activity and so are of interest to psychologists and other scientists of the mind. What sorts of interest should philosophers of the arts take in scientific approaches to such issues? Opinion currently ranges across a spectrum, with 'take no notice' at one end and 'abandon traditional philosophical methods' at the other. This collection of essays, originating in a Royal Institute of Philosophy conference at the Leeds Art Gallery in 2012, represents many of the most interesting positions along that spectrum. Contributions address issues concerning aesthetic testimony, the processing and appreciation of poetry, the aesthetics of disgust, imagination, genre, evolutionary constraints on art appreciation, creativity, musical cognition and the limitations or productiveness of empirical enquiry for philosophical aesthetics.
In one sense all philosophies attempt to analyse a small number of questions central to human life: the self, knowledge, the nature of the cosmos and reality, God or the divine. But while topics may be common, approaches have differed historically, and according to the traditions and times in which particular thinkers have worked. The Royal Institute of Philosophy's London Lecture series for 2012–13 brought together contributions from scholars expert in different traditions in order to explore continuities and discontinuities in world philosophy. In this volume there are papers on Indian thought, including Buddhist and Jain contributions, on Daoism, on modern Japanese approaches, on Jewish and Islamic thought, on stoicism, and on African philosophy, as well as on modern analytical philosophy, the so-called 'Continental' tradition and on the thought of Nietzsche.
According to its simplest definition, supererogation means freely and intentionally doing good beyond the requirements of duty. A more complex definition incorporates the responses of third parties: the supererogatory act is one that is praiseworthy if performed, but not blameworthy if omitted, as long as one does one's duty. This collection of essays, based on papers delivered at the Royal Institute of Philosophy's Annual Conference in Dublin in June 2014, explores a broad range of philosophical problems that stem from various definitions of supererogation. How can something be good and yet not required? How relevant is the agent's motivation to our assessment of that agent's sacrifice? What is the difference between supererogation and virtue? Is supererogation essential to friendship and love? Do all of us have the genuine capacity to be saints and heroes?
