The Design of Climate Policy

Debates over post-Kyoto Protocol climate change policy often take note of two issues:the feasibility and desirability of international cooperation on climate change policies, given thefailure of the United States to ratify Kyoto, and the very limited involvement of developingcountries; and the optimal timing of climate policies. These essays by leading internationaleconomists in this book offer insights on both these concerns. The book first considers theappropriate institutions for effective international cooperation on climate change, proposing analternative to the Kyoto arrangement and a theoretical framework for such a scheme. The discussionsthen turn to the stability of international environmental agreements, emphasizing the logic ofcoalition forming (including the applicability of game-theoretical analysis). Finally, contributorsaddress both practical and quantitative aspects of policy design, offering theoretical analyses ofsuch specific policy issues as intertemporal aspects of carbon trade and the optimal implementationof a sequestration policy and then using formal mathematical models to examine policies related tothe rate of climate change, international trade and carbon leakage, and the shortcomings of thestandard Global Warming Potential index.ContributorsPhilippe Ambrosi, David F. Bradford, BarbaraBuchner, Carlo Carraro, Parkash Chander, Stephane De Cara, Damien Demailly, A. Denny Ellerman, JohanEyckmans, Michael Finus, Elodie Galko, Roger Guesnerie, Jean-Charles Hourcade, Pierre-Alain Jayet,Gilles Lafforgue, Bernard Magne, Sandrine Mathy, Michel Moreaux, Sushama Murty, William A. Pizer,Philippe Quirion, Katrin Rehdanz, P. R. Shukla, Jaemin Song, Ian Sue Wing, Sylvie Thoron, Richard S.J. Tol, Henry Tulkens

Henry Tulkens is Professor of Economics and Public Finance and a member of the Center for Operations Research and Econometrics (CORE) at Universite Catholique de Louvain.