Deliberation Behind Closed Doors

Does transparency and publicity have the power to civilize politics? In deliberative democratic theory this is a common claim. Publicity, it is argued, forces actors to switch from market-style bargaining to a behaviour more appropriate for the political sphere, where the proper way of reaching agreement is by convincing others using public-spirited arguments. Daniel Naurin has conducted the first comprehensive analysis and test of the theory of publicity's civilizing effect. The theory is tested on business lobbyists -- presumably the most market-oriented actors in politics -- acting on different arenas characterized by varying degrees of transparency and publicity. Innovative scenario-interviews with lobbying consultants in Brussels and in Stockholm are compared and contrasted with a unique sample of previously confidential lobbying letters. The results are both disappointing and encouraging to deliberative democratic theorists. While the positive force of publicity seems to be overrated, it is found that even behind closed doors business lobbyists must adapt to the norms of the forum.

Daniel Naurin is since 2006 Research Fellow at the Political Science Department, Goteborg University. During 2005 and until August 2006 he was. He has previously been Marie Curie Fellow at the Robert Schumann Centre for Advanced Studies, EUI, Florence, and visiting Fellow at the Sussex European Institute, Sussex University and at the Swedish Institute of International Affairs, Stockholm. Naurin received his PhD from Goteborg University in 2004. His dissertation was awarded the 2006 Jean Blondel PhD Thesis Prize. He has articles appearing in Comparative Politics, Journal of European Integration and the Swiss Political Science Review, among others. He has published one book (in Swedish) on institutional approaches to interest groups, and is the editor (with Helen Wallace) of Unveiling the Council of the EU: Games Governments Play in Brussels, forthcoming on Palgrave Macmillan.