Strength in Numbers

When engaging in the public policy arena, diffuse interests face an uphill battle against concentrated interests that can dictate policy through a combination of industry lobbying, campaign finance, and other mechanisms. Such anyway, is the conventional view, according to Trumbull (business administration, Harvard Business School), who argues in contrast that diffuse interests (such as retirees, patients, and consumers) have historically enjoyed strong protection in the public sphere. He finds explanation for this contrast in expected outcomes in the question of legitimacy, contending that when groups of diffuse interests manage to mobilize an activist membership, they enjoy a level of legitimacy that concentrated interests groups cannot achieve, thus placing significant constraints on the influence of powerful economic actors over public policy. In presenting this more complex view of the nature of public policy influence, he analyzes five sets of comparative cross-country case studies exploring the ways in which concentrated and diffuse interests interact in the context of new government regulation. The cases include instances in which diffuse interests have been successful, such as the general consumer protection legislation passed during the 1960s and 1970s, and those in which concentrated interests have been more influential, such as in pharmaceutical and agricultural regulation, although in the latter cases he finds important constraints on producer influence that he argues have been unrecognized in standard treatments of public policy formulation (the more mixed cases of retailing and consumer credit regulation are also considered). Annotation c2012 Book News, Inc., Portland, OR (booknews.com)

Gunnar Trumbull is Associate Professor of Business Administration at Harvard Business School.