Corruption in Africa ─ Causes Consequences, and Cleanups

Reviewing the literature on corruption in Africa, Mbaku (economics, Weber State U.) argues that its persistence in the face of many anti-corruption efforts by African leaders and global institutions is explainable as a market outcome of distorted incentive structures. He employs public choice theory to demonstrate how incentive structures encourage corruption and to show the inadequacies of current anti-corruption strategies. These insights are then deployed in order to suggest different strategies for fighting corruption in the areas of public financial management and corporate governance and to critique the advice typically provided to African countries by the United States Agency for International Development, Freedom House, Transparency International, and the United Nations. Annotation c2007 Book News, Inc., Portland, OR (booknews.com)

John Mukum Mbaku is professor in the John B. Goddard School of Business and Economics at Weber State University.