Inductive Inference and Its Natural Ground ─ An Essay in Naturalistic Epistemology

Hilary Kornblith presents an account of inductive inference that addresses both itsmetaphysical and epistemological aspects. He argues that inductive knowledge is possible by virtueof the fit between our innate psychological capacities and the causal structure of theworld.

Kornblith begins by developing an account of natural kinds that has itsorigins in John Locke's work on real and nominal essences. In Kornblith's view, a natural kind is astable cluster of properties that are bound together in nature. The existence of such kinds servesas a natural ground of inductive inference.Kornblith then examines two features of human psychologythat explain how knowledge of natural kinds is attained. First, our concepts are structured innatelyin a way that presupposes the existence of natural kinds. Second, our native inferential tendenciestend to provide us with accurate beliefs about the world when applied to environments that arepopulated by natural kinds.