The Logic of American Nuclear Strategy ― Why Strategic Superiority Matters
商品資訊
系列名:Bridging the Gap
ISBN13:9780190849184
出版社:Oxford Univ Pr
作者:Matthew Kroenig
出版日:2018/02/22
裝訂/頁數:精裝/264頁
規格:24.1cm*16.5cm*2.5cm (高/寬/厚)
定價
:NT$ 2759 元無庫存,下單後進貨(到貨天數約30-45天)
下單可得紅利積點:82 點
商品簡介
作者簡介
相關商品
商品簡介
For decades, the reigning scholarly wisdom about nuclear weapons policy has been that the United States only needs the ability to absorb an enemy nuclear attack and still be able to respond with a devastating counterattack. So long as the US, or any other nation, retains such an assured retaliation capability, no sane leader would intentionally launch a nuclear attack against it, and nuclear deterrence will hold. According to this theory, possessing more weapons than necessary for a second-strike capability is illogical.
This argument is reasonable, but, when compared to the empirical record, it raises an important puzzle. Empirically, we see that the United States has always maintained a nuclear posture that is much more robust than a mere second-strike capability. In The Logic of American Nuclear Strategy, Matthew Kroenig challenges the conventional wisdom and explains why a robust nuclear posture, above and beyond a mere second-strike capability, contributes to a state's national security goals. In fact, when a state has a robust nuclear weapons force, such a capability reduces its expected costs in a war, provides it with bargaining leverage, and ultimately enhances nuclear deterrence. This book provides a novel theoretical explanation for why military nuclear advantages translate into geopolitical advantages. In so doing, it helps resolve one of the most-intractable puzzles in international security studies.
Buoyed by an innovative thesis and a vast array of historical and quantitative evidence, The Logic of American Nuclear Strategy will force scholars to reconsider their basic assumptions about the logic of nuclear deterrence.
This argument is reasonable, but, when compared to the empirical record, it raises an important puzzle. Empirically, we see that the United States has always maintained a nuclear posture that is much more robust than a mere second-strike capability. In The Logic of American Nuclear Strategy, Matthew Kroenig challenges the conventional wisdom and explains why a robust nuclear posture, above and beyond a mere second-strike capability, contributes to a state's national security goals. In fact, when a state has a robust nuclear weapons force, such a capability reduces its expected costs in a war, provides it with bargaining leverage, and ultimately enhances nuclear deterrence. This book provides a novel theoretical explanation for why military nuclear advantages translate into geopolitical advantages. In so doing, it helps resolve one of the most-intractable puzzles in international security studies.
Buoyed by an innovative thesis and a vast array of historical and quantitative evidence, The Logic of American Nuclear Strategy will force scholars to reconsider their basic assumptions about the logic of nuclear deterrence.
作者簡介
Matthew Kroenig is an Associate Professor in the Department of Government and the Edmund A. Walsh School of Foreign Service at Georgetown University and a Senior Fellow in the Brent Scowcroft Center on International Security at The Atlantic Council. He is the author or editor of six books, including Exporting the Bomb: Technology Transfer and the Spread of Nuclear Weapons.
主題書展
更多
主題書展
更多書展今日66折
您曾經瀏覽過的商品
購物須知
外文書商品之書封,為出版社提供之樣本。實際出貨商品,以出版社所提供之現有版本為主。部份書籍,因出版社供應狀況特殊,匯率將依實際狀況做調整。
無庫存之商品,在您完成訂單程序之後,將以空運的方式為你下單調貨。為了縮短等待的時間,建議您將外文書與其他商品分開下單,以獲得最快的取貨速度,平均調貨時間為1~2個月。
為了保護您的權益,「三民網路書店」提供會員七日商品鑑賞期(收到商品為起始日)。
若要辦理退貨,請在商品鑑賞期內寄回,且商品必須是全新狀態與完整包裝(商品、附件、發票、隨貨贈品等)否則恕不接受退貨。