In this book, first published in 2001, Kenneth Schultz explores the effects of democratic politics on the use and success of coercive diplomacy. He argues that open political competition between the government and opposition parties influences the decision to use threats in international crises, how rival states interpret those threats, and whether or not crises can be settled short of war. The relative transparency of their political processes means that, while democratic governments cannot easily conceal domestic constraints against using force, they can also credibly demonstrate resolve when their threats enjoy strong domestic support. As a result, compared to their non-democratic counterparts, democracies are more selective about making threats, but those they do make are more likely to be successful - that is, to gain a favorable outcome without resort to war. Schultz develops his argument through a series of game-theoretic models and tests the resulting hypothesis using both
This new introduction to world politics by three leading scholars offers a contemporary analytical approach based on the way political scientists study international relations today.
This undergraduate textbook offers visual appeal with color photos, charts, maps, and margin notes on every page. The textbook is organized around a framework that asks: Who are the relevant actors an
With a framework based on interests, interactions, and institutions, World Politics gives students the tools to understand international relations. In the thoroughly updated Fourth Edition, new Contro
Why are there wars? Why do countries struggle to cooperate to prevent genocides or to protect the environment? Why are some countries rich while others are poor? Organized around the puzzles that draw
With a framework based on interests, interactions, and institutions, World Politics gives students the tools to understand international relations. In the thoroughly updated Fourth Edition, new Contro
