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Dynamic pricing and on-line auctions are emerging as the preferred models for e-business. This multi-disciplinary 2001 book presents a framework of negotiation protocols for electronic markets. It was the first book to combine economics with computer science and the first to describe multidimensional auction mechanisms - i.e. automated negotiations on multiple attributes and/or multiple units of a product. In addition it summarises the introductory economics needed to understand electronic markets, and surveys the literature on negotiation and auction theory. Case studies include the trading of financial derivatives. For use in the design, implementation and upgrade of electronic markets, for researchers in: economics, information systems and operations management, computer science and all students of the e-commerce phenomenon.

The digital economy led to many new services where supply is matched with demand for various types of goods and services. More and more people and organizations are now in a position to design market rules that are being implemented in software. The design of markets is challenging as it needs to consider strategic behavior of market participants, psychological factors, and computational problems in order to implement the objectives of a designer. Market models in economics have not lost their importance, but the recent years have led to many new insights and principles for the design of markets, which are beyond traditional economic theory. This book introduces the fundamentals of market design, an engineering field concerned with the design of real-world markets.

Following the successful PCS Auction conducted by the US Federal Communications Commission in 1994, auctions have replaced traditional ways of allocating valuable radio spectrum, a key resource for any mobile telecommunications operator. Spectrum auctions have raised billions of dollars worldwide and have become a role model for market-based approaches in the public and private sectors. The design of spectrum auctions is a central application of game theory and auction theory due to its importance in industry and the theoretical challenges it presents. Several auction formats have been developed with different properties addressing fundamental questions about efficiently selling multiple objects to a group of buyers. This comprehensive handbook features classic papers and new contributions by international experts on all aspects of spectrum auction design, including pros and cons of different auctions and lessons learned from theory, experiments, and the field, providing a valuable res