This book focuses on some of the most important political-economic changes in advanced industrialized countries over the past two decades, namely, the sharp rise in unemployment in some countries and the growth of inequality in others. Using a variety of methodological approaches, the essays provide different pieces to this puzzle and explain how economic outcomes may be linked to macroeconomic policies and wage bargaining practices. Focusing on the experiences of northern European countries, the book also explores the intersection of partisan politics, the international economy, and nationally specific institutions.
This book, first published in 2005, builds on institutionalist theory in both economics and political science to offer a general political economy framework for the study of welfare capitalism. Based on the key idea that social protection in a modern economy, both inside and outside the state, can be understood as protection of specific investments in human capital, the book offers a systematic explanation of popular preferences for redistributive spending, the economic role of political parties and electoral systems, and labor market stratification (including gender inequality). Contrary to the popular idea that competition in the global economy undermines international differences in the level of social protection, the book argues that these differences are made possible by a high international division of labor. Such a division is what allows firms to specialize in production that requires an abundant supply of workers with specific skills, and hence high demand for protection.
This book helps explain one of the most intriguing and politically salient puzzles in comparative political economy: why some countries have much higher unemployment rates than others. Contrary to new classical economics the focus is on explaining distribution and equilibrium unemployment, and contrary to neo-corporatist theory the role of monetary policy and rational expectation is integral to the analysis. The book makes two central arguments. The first is that monetary policies affect equilibrium employment whenever wages are set above the firm level. The second argument focuses on the distributive effects of different institutions, and models institutional design as a strategic game between partisan governments and cross-class alliances of unions and employers.
This book helps explain one of the most intriguing and politically salient puzzles in comparative political economy: why some countries have much higher unemployment rates than others. Contrary to new classical economics the focus is on explaining distribution and equilibrium unemployment, and contrary to neo-corporatist theory the role of monetary policy and rational expectation is integral to the analysis. The book makes two central arguments. The first is that monetary policies affect equilibrium employment whenever wages are set above the firm level. The second argument focuses on the distributive effects of different institutions, and models institutional design as a strategic game between partisan governments and cross-class alliances of unions and employers.
This book focuses on some of the most important political-economic changes in advanced industrialized countries over the past two decades, namely, the sharp rise in unemployment in some countries and the growth of inequality in others. Using a variety of methodological approaches, the essays provide different pieces to this puzzle and explain how economic outcomes may be linked to macroeconomic policies and wage bargaining practices. Focusing on the experiences of northern European countries, the book also explores the intersection of partisan politics, the international economy, and nationally specific institutions.
This book, first published in 2005, builds on institutionalist theory in both economics and political science to offer a general political economy framework for the study of welfare capitalism. Based on the key idea that social protection in a modern economy, both inside and outside the state, can be understood as protection of specific investments in human capital, the book offers a systematic explanation of popular preferences for redistributive spending, the economic role of political parties and electoral systems, and labor market stratification (including gender inequality). Contrary to the popular idea that competition in the global economy undermines international differences in the level of social protection, the book argues that these differences are made possible by a high international division of labor. Such a division is what allows firms to specialize in production that requires an abundant supply of workers with specific skills, and hence high demand for protection.
Looking at women's power in the home, in the workplace, and in politics from a political economy perspective, Torben Iversen and Frances Rosenbluth demonstrate that equality is tied to demand for wome
"Iversen and Rosenbluth develop a microlevel bargaining model, embedded in a macrolevel comparative argument. Their illuminating analysis is a major contribution to comparative political economy and g
A groundbreaking new historical analysis of how global capitalism and advanced democracies mutually support each otherIt is a widespread view that democracy and the advanced nation-state are in crisis
