Since the global financial crisis the unprecedented role independent central banks have come to play in our societies has been increasingly disputed. This, in turn, has drawn greater attention to the
In the context of the current global financial crisis, where central banks have taken a key role in preserving systemic stability, this book brings together the three pillars of central bank governanc
Given the unprecedented role central banks have come to play in our societies, the link between their legitimacy, public support and their independence has become increasingly important. Over the past
The 2008 financial crisis led to more and more frequent political attacks on central banks. The recent spotlight on central bank independence is reminiscent of the fiery debates amongst Germany's political elites in 1949 on the same issue; debates that were sparked by the establishment of West Germany in that year. Simon Mee shows how, with the establishment of West Germany's central bank - today's Deutsche Bundesbank - the country's monetary history became a political football, as central bankers, politicians, industrialists and trade unionists all vied for influence over the legal provisions that set out the remit of the future monetary authority. The author reveals how a specific version of inter-war history, one that stresses the lessons learned from Germany's periods of inflation, was weaponised and attached to a political, contemporary argument for an independent central bank. The book challenges assumptions around the evolution of central bank independence with continued relevan
The 2008 financial crisis led to more and more frequent political attacks on central banks. The recent spotlight on central bank independence is reminiscent of the fiery debates amongst Germany's political elites in 1949 on the same issue; debates that were sparked by the establishment of West Germany in that year. Simon Mee shows how, with the establishment of West Germany's central bank - today's Deutsche Bundesbank - the country's monetary history became a political football, as central bankers, politicians, industrialists and trade unionists all vied for influence over the legal provisions that set out the remit of the future monetary authority. The author reveals how a specific version of inter-war history, one that stresses the lessons learned from Germany's periods of inflation, was weaponised and attached to a political, contemporary argument for an independent central bank. The book challenges assumptions around the evolution of central bank independence with continued relevan
Banking on Reform examines the political determinants of recent reforms to monetary policy institutions in the industrial democracies. With these reforms, political parties have sought to draw on the
Capitalism, Not Globalism shows that, while much has been made of recent changes in the international economy, the mechanisms by which politicians control the economy have not changed throughout the p
This book examines the linkage between central bank structure, central bank autonomy—with respect to setting its monetary policy goals, choosing its policy mechanisms, legal independence, and financia
Alex Cukierman is known for his work on central bank behaviour. This book brings together a large body of Cukierman's research and integrates it with developments in the political economy of monetary
Alex Cukierman is well known for his work on central bank behavior. This book brings together a large body of Cukierman's research and integrates it with recent developments in the political economy o
Most studies of the political economy of money focus on the laws protecting central banks from government interference; this book turns to the overlooked people who actually make monetary policy decisions. Using formal theory and statistical evidence from dozens of central banks across the developed and developing worlds, this book shows that monetary policy agents are not all the same. Molded by specific professional and sectoral backgrounds and driven by career concerns, central bankers with different career trajectories choose predictably different monetary policies. These differences undermine the widespread belief that central bank independence is a neutral solution for macroeconomic management. Instead, through careful selection and retention of central bankers, partisan governments can and do influence monetary policy - preserving a political trade-off between inflation and real economic performance even in an age of legally independent central banks.
Most studies of the political economy of money focus on the laws protecting central banks from government interference; this book turns to the overlooked people who actually make monetary policy decisions. Using formal theory and statistical evidence from dozens of central banks across the developed and developing worlds, this book shows that monetary policy agents are not all the same. Molded by specific professional and sectoral backgrounds and driven by career concerns, central bankers with different career trajectories choose predictably different monetary policies. These differences undermine the widespread belief that central bank independence is a neutral solution for macroeconomic management. Instead, through careful selection and retention of central bankers, partisan governments can and do influence monetary policy - preserving a political trade-off between inflation and real economic performance even in an age of legally independent central banks.
As EU non-majoritarian bodies such as the European Commission, the Court of Justice of the European Union, and the European Central Bank grow in political influence, many have identified the pressing
Since the economic crisis unfolded in 2008, the European Union economic governance framework has been profoundly transformed from a legal perspective. The EU has adopted new tools, institutions and rules to tackle the changes and is arguably better prepared to combat any future crises. This book analyses the basic legal framework of EU economic governance and considers the economic underpinnings which underlie legal institutions in this area. It uses analytical dialectics as a method of analysis and the paradigm of 'law as credibility' as the main model through which the substantive parts of EU economic governance are accounted for. Important issues such as access, exit and expulsion from the euro, the independence of the European Central Bank, the Stability and Growth Pact, bail-outs to member states, and the EU's economic strategy are addressed in a clear, critical and innovative way.
