The conflict in Northern Ireland remains unlike any other campaign conducted by the British Army this century. There have been no set-piece battles, no decisive victories or crushing defeats; just a g
The European Convention on Human Rights has been a standard-setting text for transitions to peace and democracy in states throughout Europe. This book analyses the content, role and effects of the jurisprudence of the European Court relating to societies in transition. It features a wide range of transitional challenges, from killings by security forces in Northern Ireland to property restitution in East Central Europe, and from political upheaval in the Balkans to the position of religious minorities and Roma. Has the European Court developed a specific transitional jurisprudence? How do politics affect the ways in which the Court's judgments are implemented? Does the Court's case-law itself become woven into narratives of struggle in transitional societies? This book seeks to answer these questions by highlighting the unique role of Europe's main guardian of human rights, the Court in Strasbourg. It includes a comparison with the Inter-American and African human rights systems.
The exposure of two senior republicans as informers for British intelligence in 2005 led to a popular perception that the IRA had 'lost' the intelligence war and was pressurised into peace. In this first in-depth study across the entire conflict, Thomas Leahy re-evaluates the successes and failures of Britain's intelligence activities against the IRA, from the use of agents and informers to special-forces, surveillance and electronic intelligence. Using new interview material alongside memoirs and Irish and UK archival materials, he suggests that the IRA was not forced into peace by British intelligence. His work sheds new light on key questions in intelligence and security studies. How does British intelligence operate against paramilitaries? Is it effective? When should governments 'talk to terrorists'? And does regional variation explain the outcome of intelligence conflicts? This is a major contribution to the history of the conflict and of why peace emerged in Northern Ireland.
The exposure of two senior republicans as informers for British intelligence in 2005 led to a popular perception that the IRA had 'lost' the intelligence war and was pressurised into peace. In this first in-depth study across the entire conflict, Thomas Leahy re-evaluates the successes and failures of Britain's intelligence activities against the IRA, from the use of agents and informers to special-forces, surveillance and electronic intelligence. Using new interview material alongside memoirs and Irish and UK archival materials, he suggests that the IRA was not forced into peace by British intelligence. His work sheds new light on key questions in intelligence and security studies. How does British intelligence operate against paramilitaries? Is it effective? When should governments 'talk to terrorists'? And does regional variation explain the outcome of intelligence conflicts? This is a major contribution to the history of the conflict and of why peace emerged in Northern Ireland.
